With financial globalization, investors can gain from diversification if returns from financial markets are stable and not correlated. However with volatility spillovers, increase in crossmarket correlations exist as a real-effect and are not taken into account for asset allocation and portfolio composition. This chapter assesses financial contagion from two recent trends in the world economy: the global financial crisis and the 2011 Japanese natural disasters (tsunami, earthquake and nuclear crises).
Introduction
Globalization has been recognized as the principal force dominating the economic universe. It upholds to illuminate the world with economic prosperity and seeks a victory of market over government and self-interest over altruism. No less imperative is the global commitment to continuing and accelerating the pace of human development, which indicate the culmination of the historical processes of cultural advances. The dilemma however is that, while the phenomenon is a lusty, ineluctable process whose march can be stopped only by endangering the prosperity of peoples and nations, it also threatens to disfigure development in the manner it is evolving. As a dynamic force for change throughout the world, it is expected to stimulate unprecedented surges in the wealth of nations by extending outwards the world production possibility frontier and redefining world markets as a "Global Village".
With growing efforts toward financial liberalization, financial integration among economies has the benefit of improving allocation efficiency and diversifying risks. Despite these potential benefits, recent trends in the global economy suggest that crises in one country can easily spread to other countries through different channels as a result of financial globalization. In this chapter, we assess whether global financial markets have been vulnerable to contagion during some crises that have marked the global landscape in recent memory, notably: the 2007 global financial crisis and the 2011 Japanese tsunami, earthquake and nuclear crises. Hence, we aim to assess global evidence of financial market contagion from financial crisis and natural disasters.
Over the past decade, the concern about regional and global integration of emerging equity markets has been largely debated. The recent global financial meltdown and economic downturn has left many analysts concerned about whether emerging markets suffered from contagion (Asongu, 2012a) . Most of these markets were still in their infancy before the start of the millennium, which rendered an examination of the transmission of financial variable movements from global crisis somewhat impractical. Hence, the effects of the US stock Natural disasters have inflicted serious damages on human life, property and economy (Asongu, 2012b) . Though many earthquakes occur worldwide on a yearly basis and impact all walks of life in one way or the other, collateral effects resulting from such natural disasters could be quite detrimental financially and economically. The recent Japanese earthquake has resulted in collateral damages that make the disaster particularly significant. On March 11, 2011 , Tohoku in Japan was hit by a 9.0 magnitude undersea mega thrust earthquake. This powerful shock triggered a tsunami that struck coastlines across the east of the country, leaving thousands dead and inflicting considerable property damages. But what has startled analysts and left them very concerned over the consequences of this earthquake is the nuclear disaster resulting there-from. Classified as a level-seven event on the International Nuclear Event Scale, the Fukushima nuclear incident has posed a risk equal to the worst nuclear power 2 Long-term Capital Management.
plant accident in history (Chernobyl disaster). With much uncertainty over how the crisis would have been managed, it is imperative to investigate how international financial markets reacted three months into the crises. Therefore, the second goal of this chapter is to examine whether any contagion effect occurred a few months after the Japanese earthquake, tsunami and worst nuclear crisis since Chernobyl.
There are many reasons this chapter should be dedicated to studying the extent to which financial markets have been affected by the recent financial and natural crises. Among others, results of the studies could enable analysts and policy makers evaluate the benefits of international trade and cross-border investments, and hence, the attractiveness of foreign capital inflows. The results could also provide some basis on how developing countries stand to benefit (loss) from (in) long-run investment sources and global financial booms (as a result of external financial shocks) through financial market integration. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 examine related literature with emphasis on the effects of financial market integration, linkages between financial market integration and crises, definitions and channels of contagion and, how to measure contagion. Section 3 provides evidence of contagion from the 2007 global financial crisis in financial markets of developing countries. In Section 4, global international stock indices and exchange rates are investigated for contagion after the 2011 Japanese tsunami, earthquake and nuclear crises. We conclude with Section 5.
Related literature

Effects of financial market integration
Financial integration between economies is believed to have two main positive impacts: the improvement of capital allocation efficiency and diversification of risks However, the recent global financial crisis which is considered by many analysts and policymakers as the worst since the Great Depression has cast a dark shadow on the contagion effect of financial integration; despite its advantages. There is a broad economics and finance literature that addresses the potential benefits of financial integration.
From a theoretical perspective, financial globalization should facilitate efficient international allocation of capital and improve international risks sharing (Kose et al., 2011; Asongu, 2012a Kose et al. (2011) . Their study has revealed that, countries with low levels of financial depth and institutional quality do not stand to benefit from financial integration. This perspective is in line with Schmukler (2004) who had stressed that: the importance of sound financial fundamentals and strong macroeconomic institutions; the presence of which should enable more effective management of crises and lower the probability of crises and contagion. Hence, financial globalization could itself be a source of crises.
Linkages between financial integration (globalization) and crises
We have observed that financial globalization has several potential benefits. However the recent stream of financial crises and contagion due to the growing liberalization of financial systems and integration of financial markets around the world, have led many analysts to conclude that globalization breeds financial volatility and crises (Asongu, 2012ab) .
Though domestic factors are usually at the origin of crises, there are different channels through which financial globalization could be related to crises.
Firstly, as emphasized by Schmukler (2004) , when a country's financial system is liberalized, it becomes an object of market discipline exercised by both foreign and domestic investors. In a closed economy, only domestic investors monitor and react to unsound economic fundamentals while, in an open one domestic and foreign investors might prompt the country to achieve sound fundamentals. As pointed-out earlier, the absence of sound macroeconomic, financial and institutional fundamentals could substantially increase the probability of crises. It logically follows that, conflicting interests and views between investors (domestic and foreign) on key fundamentals might precipitate crises and reduce the ability of governments to effectively monitor and manage them.
Secondly, even with sound domestic economic fundamentals and quality institutions, international financial market imperfections could also lead to crises. Among other things, these could lead to irrational behavior, herding behavior, speculative attacks, bubbles, and crashes. In plainer terms, regardless of market fundamentals, investors could speculate against a currency if they believe that the exchange rate is unsustainable, which could ultimately lead to self-fulfilling balance-of-payments. This thesis illustrated by Obstfeld (1986) has been purported by Schmukler (2004) , amongst others.
Thirdly, even in the presence of sound fundamentals and absence of imperfections in international capital markets, crises might still arise on the grounds of external factors (Schmukler, 2004 ) such as determinants of capital flows (Calvo et al., 1996) and foreign interest rates (Frankel and Rose, 1996) . For example if a country becomes dependent on foreign capital, variations in foreign capital flows could create financial issues and economic downturns. Frankel and Rose (1996) clearly emphasize the role foreign interest rates play in determining the likelihood of financial crises in developing countries.
Fourthly, still consistent with Schmukler (2004) , financial globalization could lead to financial crises by contagion, namely by shocks via real links, financial links and herdingbehavior or unexplained high correlations. This chapter will focus on this fourth example 3 ; the elucidation and definition of which are worthwhile. 3 That on the link between financial integration and crisis. From an empirical standpoint, the third definition was first proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) . They assessed contagion as a significant increase in market co-movements after a shock has occurred in one country (or market). According to this definition, the condition for contagion is a significant increase in co-movements as a result of a shock in one market. Accordingly, if two markets display a high degree of co-movements during the stability period, even if they are highly correlated during a crisis, if this crisis-correlation is not significant it does not amount to contagion. In the absence of a significant correlation during the crisis-period, the term 'interdependence' is used to qualify the situation between the two markets (or countries). 
Definitions and channels of contagion
Definitions of contagion
Channels of contagion
Measuring contagion
The 2007 financial crisis
Financial integration among economies has the benefit of improving allocation efficiency and diversifying risk. However the recent global financial crisis, considered as the worst since the Great Depression has re-ignited the fierce debate about the merits of financial globalization and its implications for growth especially in developing countries (Asongu, 2012a ). This section examines whether equity markets in emerging countries were vulnerable to contagion during the recent global financial meltdown.
Data
The purpose of this study is to investigate correlations between the returns of the USA (2002) have shown that using dollar or local indices will produce similar outcomes.
Methodology
Contagion is defined by Forbes and Rigobon as a significant increase in market comovements after a shock has occurred in one country 7 .
The correlation coefficient is defined as:
where: 'x' is the base criterion while 'y' is an emerging equity market.
Consistent with Forbes and Rigobon, the correlation coefficient is adjusted in the following manner:
Where: 5 Date at which, BNP Paribas announced the closure of its funds that held US subprime debts. 6 From the empirical literature, the tranquil period is always longer than the turmoil period. For instance it is longer by a year, ten and a half months and nine months in Forbes & Rigobon (2002), Collins & Biekpe (2003) and Lee et al. (2007) respectively. 7 According to this definition, the presence of high correlation between two markets during the stable period and eventually a sustained increase in the high degree of cross market co-movements at the turmoil period does not amount to contagion. Hence, contagion according to this definition is the presence of significant increase in comovements after a shock. On the other hand, if the high correlation degree is not significant, the term 'interdependence' is used to qualify to relationship. The following hypotheses are then tested: 0 :
H is the null hypothesis of no contagion while 1 H is the alternative hypothesis for the presence of contagion n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n. (35+61-4) ;(17+61-4) for the long, medium and short terms respectively. σ: represents the standard deviation. ρ*stp, ρ*mtp, ρ*ltp denote adjusted correlation coefficients for the short, medium and long term periods respectively. δ: correlation coefficient adjuster.
Table1: International stock indexes returns conditional (unadjusted) correlation coefficient s in 2007 financial crisis
Presentation of results and discussion
As shown in Tables 1-2, contagion results 
The 2011 Japanese earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crises
Natural disasters may inflict significant damage upon international financial markets.
The purpose of this section is to investigate if any contagion effect occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese earthquake, tsunami and subsequent nuclear crises.
"Whereas the Indian current account has been opened fully though gradually in the 1990s, a more calibrated approach has been followed in the opening of the capital account and subsequently the financial sector. This approach is consistent with the weight of available empirical evidence on the benefits of capital account liberalization for acceleration of economic growth, particularly in emerging economies. Evidence suggests that the greatest gains are obtained from openness to foreign direct investment followed by portfolio investment. Benefits resulting from external debt flows are questionable until greater domestic financial market development has taken place" (Henry, 2007).
Data
To investigate the correlations among returns of the Japanese daily stock index (exchange rate) and 33 international stock indices (exchange rates) returns, the Japanese equity and foreign exchange markets are the base criteria. Thus, we examine whether comovements among national stock and foreign exchange markets increased significantly after the major earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disasters. The sample period is divided into two 
Methodology
Borrowing from Forbes and Rigobon, contagion is a significant increase in market comovements after a shock has occurred in one country.
The coefficient of correlation is defined as:
Where: 'x' represents the base criterion and 'y' an international market. This correlation coefficient is adjusted in the following manner to take account of heteroscedasticity:
Where: Table 4 presents unconditional correlation coefficients. These adjusted correlations are higher than their unadjusted counterparts in Table   3 . Ultimately, the findings in Table 3 are robust to those in Table 4 . Table 6 confirm those in Table 5 . Ultimately, no national/regional exchange market is found to have suffered from contagion two months in the aftermath of the Japanese earthquake and the ensuing collateral disasters. . The full period is the stable period plus the medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion .While "Y" denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, "N" indicates that the test statistics was less or equal to the critical value and no contagion occurred. Note 3: Correlation coefficients are unadjusted for heteroscedasticity. n.a 0.000 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n. . The full period is the stable period plus the medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion .While "Y" denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, "N" indicates that the test statistics was less or equal to the critical value and no contagion occurred. Note 3: Correlation coefficients are unadjusted for heteroscedasticity. . The full period is the stable period plus the medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion .While "Y" denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, "N" indicates that the test statistics was less or equal to the critical value and no contagion occurred. ρ*stp, ρ*mtp, denote adjusted correlation coefficients for the short and medium term periods respectively. δ: correlation coefficient adjuster. Note 3: Correlation coefficients are adjusted for heteroscedasticity using Equation 2.
Contagion effect in international exchange rates returns after earthquake
Discussion of results, policy implications and future research directions
This section has examined if the March 2011 Japanese earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster affected the stability of the correlation structure in international stock and foreign exchange markets.
On a first note, with regard to international equity markets, there is substantial evidence of contagion in Taiwan Moreover, since Japanese factories generally produce consumer goods rather than intermediate products, disruptions to outbound shipments should not have been expected to seriously affect production processes in other countries.
On managing and mitigating spillovers and contagion, it is worth emphasizing that globalization comes with costs and benefits. Therefore, managing financial market contagion resulting from natural disasters requires that governments minimize the costs and maximize the benefits of financial market integration. Most countries in the sample have undoubtedly benefited from integration, however based on the weight of empirical evidence above; measures need to be taken in an effort to manage the downside ramifications of integration in the event of a natural disaster.
The following are some recommendations policy makers need to take into account in order to minimize (mitigate) the adverse financial market effects of disasters.
(1) The banking system of a country should not be directly exposed to foreign assets that natural disasters can easily stress and render worthless. This recommendation also applies to assets in institutions that natural disasters could make futile. Accordingly, this caution would attenuate the knockon effects through monetary, financial and real channels. (2) Domestic financial markets (equity, money, foreign exchange and credit markets) may also suffer due to the 'substitution effect'. As credit channels and credit lines in the affected (or contaminated) countries run dry, some of the credit-demand earlier met by overseas financing could easily shift to the domestic sector and put pressure on domestic resources. The reversal of capital flows arising from the de-leveraging process could put pressure on the foreign exchange market, leading to sharp fluctuations in overnight money market rates and undue depreciation of currency. Hence, it is in the interest of central banks to adopt a monetary policy stance that is adequate to growth, inflation and financial stability concerns. (3) In circumstances where the natural disaster mirrors an expected decline in inflation, it is also in the interest of the central bank to adjust its monetary stance and manage liquidity: both domestic and foreign exchange to ensure that credit continues to flow for productive activities at both aggregate and sector specific levels.
(4) In order to enable economic agents plan their business activities with more assurance, the central bank could ensure an orderly adjustment of the pain of its policies by maintaining a comfortable liquidity position: ensuring that the weighted average overnight money market rate is maintained within the repo-reverse repo corridor (margin) and ensure conditions conducive for flow of credit to productive sectors (particularly the stressed export industry sectors).
Before we conclude this section, it is important to highlight the implications of this paper to the future of natural disasters. Though the crisis is over, from a financial standpoint the following concerns on future natural disasters are most likely to preoccupy policymakers. banking system' that encourages loose practices, hunt for quick yields and 'non-transparent and risky' financial products, when systems unravel (due to natural disasters), many of these institutions will pose a systematic risk to the financial systems. Therefore, the regulatory architecture has to be modeled (and/or fashioned) to keep pace with innovation and the possibility of natural shocks. (4) Simulating natural disasters and learning how to manage global imbalances resulting from them could also help countries brace for potential financial and real sector consequences of natural crises.
Conclusion
Financial integration among economies has the benefit of improving allocation efficiency and risk diversification. However the recent global financial crisis, considered as the most severe since the Great Depression has re-ignited a fierce debate about the merits of financial globalization and its implications for growth especially in developing countries. A section in this chapter has examined whether equity markets in emerging countries were vulnerable to contagion during the recent global financial meltdown. Findings have shown:
(1) with the exceptions of India and Dhaka, Asian markets were worst hit; (2) Firstly, we have confirmed the existing consensus that in the face of natural crises that could take an international scale, only emerging markets are overwhelmingly affected .Secondly, we have also shown that international financial market transmissions not only occur during financial crisis; natural disaster effects should not be undermined. Other policy implications and future research directions have been discussed.
